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I. Introduction
The regulation of political spending remains an enduring target of public and academic
attention in the major democracies. Controversy emerges not merely from conflicting normative
theories of democracy, but also from deep uncertainty about the impact of spending on election
outcomes. Political liberals in the United States, for instance, regularly premise their critiques of
court decisions such as Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010) on the empirical
proposition that spending disparities drive election results, as do defenders of the public
financing schemes so prevalent in other leading democracies (Scarrow 2007). And while formal
models differ on whether spending improves welfare by more efficiently translating public goods
preferences into votes (Coate 2004), or diminishes it by undermining the median voter theorem
(Grossman and Helpman 1994), the significance for public policy of either view hinges on the
causal relationship between money and votes.
Indeed, despite the importance of the research question, the growing worldwide academic
literature on the subject reveals profound disagreement among experts on spending effects. Some
authors find that expenditure by both incumbents and challengers raises a candidate’s vote share
(Green and Krasno 1988; Palda 1994; Gerber 2004). Others argue that spending aids challengers,
but is of almost no benefit to incumbents (Jacobson 1978, 1985). Lastly, some—including, most
famously, Steven Levitt (1994)—argue that once properly estimated, the influence of spending is
nearly zero for both incumbents and challengers. This uncertainty is unsurprising: measuring the
causal effect of spending on election outcomes is a thorny undertaking. The data-generating
process for both variables is nested within a confluence of other causal relationships. If a
candidate’s spending level and vote share are simultaneously determined, a simple regression of
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his vote share on his spending level is likely to be biased. Moreover, any apparent statistical
relationship between expenditure and vote share is easily the product, in part, of the effects of a
host of unobserved explanatory variables correlated with the regression error. Perhaps the most
obvious example is the candidate’s quality. Excellent candidates might disproportionately attract
both votes and donations (Mebane, Ratkovic, and Tofias 2001)—leading to an upward bias in the
estimated effect of spending. On the other hand, a downward bias arises if funds are
systematically directed toward weaker districts, and away from areas where an easy victory is
expected. Further examples of omitted variables are easy to imagine.
Recent studies have also increasingly wrestled with a second problem: in addition to the
threat of bias, researchers must contend with the oft-unobserved heterogeneity of spending itself.
A possible explanation for the literature’s diverse findings is that different studies measure the
ultimate impact of different mixtures of political activity. If a particular budget comprises several
distinct forms of expenditure with unequal returns, then how this budget is deployed contributes
to the overall impact of spending. In the United States, for example, funds spent on
communication with voters are roughly three times as effective as the remainder of a candidate’s
budget (Ansolabehere and Gerber 1994). This fact suggests that researchers need to look toward
the underlying mixture of expenditures whose impact is measured, as well as how practitioners
might use additional funding under various proposed policy reforms.
In this essay, I develop a regression-discontinuity design to circumvent the endogeneity
of spending levels, taking advantage of Canada’s wealth of disaggregated data and a natural
experiment generated by its public financing system. Regression-discontinuity (RD) designs
exploit cutoff points in the rules governing the assignment of real-world treatments to identify
treatment effects in the immediate neighborhood of these thresholds (Thistlethwaite and
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Campbell 1960). Here, I exploit the following cutoff point: under the Canada Elections Act
(Elections Canada 2004), federal legislative candidates who receive at least ten percent of the
vote in their district receive a reimbursement of sixty percent of their campaign expenses
following the election, the bulk of which arrives in the coffers of the local district association of
their party shortly thereafter. Under the assumption that candidates on either side of the ten
percent threshold are otherwise not systematically different prior to the election, the event of
reimbursement generates a “downstream experiment” that permits the unbiased estimation of the
treatment effect of this additional spending on other variables (Gerber and Green 2003). Using
administrative data on recent elections to the Canadian House of Commons, I first estimate the
effect of this additional funding on the party’s local spending decisions—both in total and
disaggregated by category—during the interval prior to the following election. I conclude that
receiving a reimbursement increases the spending level of a local party association dramatically,
but that this increase overwhelmingly takes the form of greater overhead, rather than additional
contact with the electorate. I then estimate the impact of this spending grant on the party’s local
electoral success in the following election. The overall impact of reimbursement is negligible,
suggesting that the additional overhead spending represents inefficient decisions on the part of
local party operatives.
The remainder of this essay unfolds as follows. In Part II, I review the literature on the
effects of spending on electoral outcomes. Part III outlines the relevant features of the Canadian
system of political financing. Part IV introduces the dataset, offering summary statistics and
describing the procedures I followed to construct it from publicly available sources. In Part V, I
first present a simple model relating spending to election outcomes. I then develop the
regression-discontinuity design, explaining how estimating the conditional expectation function
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at the cutoff point identifies the spending effect for units in the immediate vicinity of the
threshold, while avoiding the biases endemic to existing research. Part VI presents my main
results, which I subject to further tests in Part VII. Part VIII concludes, speaking to the validity
of my findings and their broader implications for public policy. Throughout, I integrate my
analysis with perspectives gleaned from a series of interviews with practitioners.
II. Literature
Ever since the public availability of comprehensive data on political expenditures in the
late 1970s, the classic analysis has been an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of a
candidate’s vote share on his spending level, or a transformation thereof, typically with a suite of
other covariates thought to affect election outcomes. Jacobson inaugurates the genre with his
study of elections to the U.S. House of Representatives (1978), yielding the remarkable finding
that while the effect of challenger spending is large, the effect of incumbent spending is
miniscule—approaching zero, and negative under some statistical specifications. Since Jacobson,
scholars of American politics have debated these influential conclusions. Abramowitz’s analysis
of Senate elections buttresses them (1988), but other authors arrive at a range of divergent results
after applying more sophisticated econometric models. Green and Krasno (1988) find substantial
and significant spending effects for both incumbents and challengers in the U.S. House after
employing lagged spending as an instrumental variable and introducing controls for the quality
of the challenger. Gerber’s (1998) study of elections to the U.S. Senate mirrors this result: he
also exploits an array of instrumental variables, such as candidate wealth, as exogenous
determinants of spending. Erikson and Palfrey (2000) account for the simultaneity of spending
6
and vote share by introducing assumptions regarding the relationship between their covariances.
They find the spending of both challengers and incumbents to be impactful, but that an
incumbent’s returns to spending diminish with his time in office. Steven Levitt (1994), on the
other hand, uses first-differencing to compare just those pairs of U.S. House candidates who
repeatedly faced each other in the same district and thus account for district- and candidate-
specific effects, after which his estimates of the influence of spending dwindle to nearly zero for
both challengers and incumbents.
Research on spending in other democracies—almost exclusively OLS—parallels this
wide range of findings. Early work on the United Kingdom found almost no impact to local
advertising spending (Johnston 1983). A later study suggests that a parliamentary candidate who
increases his spending level by one percentage point increases his vote share by 0.1 percentage
points (Pattie, Johnston, and Fieldhouse 1996). In his study of France, Palda uncovers what
appears to be a strong spending effect, and also replicates Jacobson’s discrepancy between
incumbent and challenger spending (1998). Palda’s work on Canada, meanwhile, estimates a
return of 0.62 votes for each 1979 Canadian dollar spent by a challenger (1985). Carty and
Eagles (1999, 85) reiterate his result, turning up “unequivocal evidence” of a “distinctive” effect
using an OLS regression of vote share in the 1988 Canadian election on local spending levels, a
finding they reprise when they reanalyze the data using various instrumental variables (2004).
Taken together, the bevy of prior studies on American and international spending effects
implies—though by no means confirms—an impact, particularly for challengers. Nonetheless,
the range of findings is extremely wide. Table 1 reveals the divergence in the challenger’s
estimated cost per vote, from $5 to well over $100.2 Without a strong sense of the weight to
2 Throughout the text of this essay, I convert cost per vote figures to 2004 Canadian dollars as best I can.
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assign to each finding, the social planner choosing among alternative regimes of political
financing faces an impasse.
Indeed, disparate answers are to be expected, for two reasons. First, to the extent that
spending is heterogeneous, each study evaluates a distinct treatment. As I suggest in the
Introduction, different forms of expenditure may vary markedly in effectiveness (Ansolabehere
and Gerber 1994). Second, variability in the coefficients reported in observational work reflects
both modeling uncertainty and sampling uncertainty (Gerber, Green, and Kaplan 2002). Since
the corpus of scholarship on spending is almost wholly observational, nearly every previous
estimate depends upon the reader’s acceptance of strong statistical assumptions for its veracity.
We should be particularly cautious with respect to the weight we place on studies that use only
OLS, because unobserved explanatory variables may severely bias the findings, even in the
presence of suitable covariates. The instrumental variables studies are on sounder
methodological footing, but still face the threat of bias because of the difficulty of locating
spending instruments that meet the exclusion restriction.3 Commonly used instruments such as
lagged spending and personal wealth might still be associated with unobserved variables, such as
a candidate’s quality, that undermine their exogeneity.
Perhaps in response to these problems, a field experimental literature has bloomed that
evaluates the impact of specific forms of voter contact on a candidate’s vote share, such as
telephone calls and direct mail. Because of randomization, these studies escape the threat of bias
that plagues observational work; because they evaluate specific treatments, these studies avoid
the problem of heterogeneous spending. Instead of drawing generalizations from evaluations of
indiscrete summations of expenditures, analysts might use a stockpile of experimental
3 A secondary issue is that the bias arising from a less-than-strong correlation between the instruments and
the explanatory variable may be dramatic (Bound, Jaeger, and Baker 1995).
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evaluations to predict the effectiveness of various hypothetical budgets, where the overall
effectiveness of a budget is the weighted average of its components. Gerber (2004) synthesizes a
body of these experiments and concludes that mailings sent by the challenger are effective, but
that mailings sent by the incumbent are much less so. A recent study of radio advertising echoes
this discovery: nonpartisan messages listing information about upcoming local elections appear
to boost the challenger’s vote share by raising his profile within the electorate (Panagopoulos and
Green 2008). Two recent Canadian field experiments, on the other hand, point in conflicting
directions. One study finds that leafleting during a nomination contest has no effect on vote share
(Loewen and Rubenson 2007). In another, a Green Party literature drop was effective among
voters of high socioeconomic status, although the effect was not significant among the entire
treated sample (Brown, Perrella, and Kay 2010). These efforts are encouraging, and further
research promises us an increasingly nuanced understanding of the relationship between political
advertising and vote share. Yet all such studies face a limitation: if the effectiveness of the
remainder of a budget (such as staff salaries, consulting fees, or office expenses) is not tested
experimentally, uncertainty persists regarding the overall impact of spending.
This essay extends the tradition of some of the best existing work through careful
attention to the twin problems of endogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity. By exploiting a
naturally-occurring threshold for reimbursements, the RD design permits the clean identification
of both the effect these grants on the spending decisions of practitioners and the downstream
consequences of these choices for election outcomes. Computing the ratio of additional dollars to
votes produces an estimate of the marginal returns to spending for candidates in the
neighborhood of the point of discontinuity.
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III. Public Financing of Canadian Campaigns
Several political systems publicly finance campaigns using a reimbursement scheme.
Reimbursements based on local vote share are paid in France and Italy, among other European
nations, and in the U.S. states of Minnesota and until recently, Connecticut.4 Canada’s system of
public financing is unique, however, in combining payments to candidates, not just parties, with
a robust system of local constituency associations, so that receiving a reimbursement plausibly
increases future local spending. The scheme functions in the following way: after each of the ten
national elections since 1979, every federal legislative candidate who wins or receives a
particular fraction of the vote in his local district draws a reimbursement of his campaign
expenditures from the Canadian federal treasury. The precise rules originate in the 1974 Election
Expenses Act, and are subject to periodic revision. From 1974 to 1983, the reimbursement
threshold was fifteen percent of the vote in each electoral district. The reimbursement’s size
varied according to a formula that included several variables, including the number of voters, the
price of postage, and the geographic area of the district.5 From 1984 through 2000, the fifteen
percent threshold remained, but the size was set at fifty percent of the candidate’s total campaign
expenses––the sum of polling, travel, salaries, and so forth. Finally, since the 2004 election, the
threshold has been lowered to ten percent, and the expense fraction increased to sixty percent.
Figure 1 reveals a useful histogram of the magnitudes of reimbursements paid to the candidates
of the major parties after the 2004 and 2006 federal elections. The mean reimbursement, among
reimbursed candidates, was $29,235.71, with a standard deviation of $14,326.41 (n = 1,392).
4 In August 2009, Connecticut’s public financing scheme was ruled in violation of the U.S. Constitution by
the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals.
5 For details, see the Statutes of Canada, 1973-1974, p. 761-763.
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The Canadian system of local district associations also merits further attention. Unusual
in their strength and autonomy, the parties’ local associations account for the bulk of Canadian
grassroots political activity, both during the six-week campaign period and in between elections
(Carty and Eagles 2004). These local district, or “riding,” associations solicit volunteers and
contributions, nominate the local candidate, and spend heavily. Table 2 reveals several summary
statistics for the finances of these organizations. These totals—nearly $30,000 per year, for
districts with an average population of 110,000—may appear small in light of the recent
explosion in political spending in the United States. But they are closer to spending levels in
elections to the U.S. House of Representatives during an earlier era. In 1972, candidates spent an
average of about $500,0006 (Ansolabehere, Gerber, and Snyder 2001) in legislative districts
averaging four times the size of Canadian ridings. These figures are also at par with spending
levels in other advanced democracies, such as the United Kingdom, where spending levels
average about $20,000 per district in districts of a similar population to Canada’s (Pattie,
Johnston, and Fieldhouse 1996).
This paper’s identification strategy relies on the following fact: after a candidate is
reimbursed, he returns his surplus campaign funds to his local association to be spent over the
years to follow, sometimes less a small tax to the national party. The local association uses the
funds in the intervening years to support grassroots political activity. In order to explore the
potential for these funds to affect election outcomes, I asked several politicians and district
leaders to describe the role the associations play in election campaigns. They told me there is
little distinction in practice between campaign activities that formally endorse a candidate and
association activities that focus on building local support for the party. Speaking of his district
association, for instance, an anonymous New Democratic Party leader in Ontario explained: “we
6 This figure, as well the others in this section, is inflated to 2004 dollars from $330,000 (1990 dollars).
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can literally have a campaign event during a campaign that was just ‘building membership.’”
Leaders also identified reimbursement as a crucial variable driving the vigor of an association’s
activities. In the words of a Conservative leader in a district where the Conservative Party
received 9.9% of the vote during the 2008 election, for example, “it [not receiving
reimbursement] has left us without any room to maneuver or put on any activities within the
associations…you find that you’re not as organized.” In short, the structure of the Canadian
political system supports the hypothesis that receipt of a reimbursement after one election
increases the local association’s spending level during the years before the next election.
IV. Data
The quantitative data analyzed in this paper are administrative records collected by the
Canadian federal government. History of Federal Ridings since 1867 (Parliament of Canada
2010), a website maintained by the Canadian Parliament, contains information on the results of
elections for Canada’s House of Commons. I collected data for every candidate from each of the
ten elections from 1979 to 2008, which I coded by party, district, province, year, vote share, and
absolute number of votes received. For each case, I matched the party and district in one election
with the party and district in the succeeding election, leaving nine pairs of elections.
Redistricting occurs in Canada about every ten years; during the time period covered by my
dataset, redistricting has occurred in 1985, 1996, and 2003, leading me to drop pairs of elections
bridging these years. Six pairs of elections remained: 1979 to 1980, 1980 to 1984, 1988 to 1993,
1997 to 2000, 2004 to 2006, and 2006 to 2008. Table 3 offers informative summary statistics
regarding the results of recent elections.
12
Within pairs, I removed observations lacking a party affiliation, those designated as
“Independent,” or those affiliated with the “Rhino” party, a spoof party that often runs multiple
candidates in one district. Using History of Federal Ridings listings of the dates and results of
special elections, I dropped candidates who did not serve a full term. I also eliminated the
handful of candidates who won an election but did not meet the reimbursement cutoff, because
under Canadian election law, the winner of an election draws a reimbursement regardless of vote
share. On several occasions, two parties merged, or a party’s name changed; in these situations, I
recoded the party’s earlier name as its later name. On about 150 occasions during my time
period, districts’ names were changed by Parliament between elections, even as their boundaries
remained unchanged, a problem I resolved by constructing a correspondence table from the
legislative history of the House of Commons (Parliament of Canada 2010). Lastly, I inspected
the dataset to locate districts that could not be matched between elections. In approximately 30 of
these situations, the failure to match was a product of misspellings, which I corrected. The full
dataset contains 8,339 cases.
Elections Canada maintains files with the annual financial returns of each party’s local
district associations from 2004 to 2008 (Elections Canada 2010). These returns reveal the
contribution, expense, and transfer totals of each association. Although associations need not
report each specific expense, Elections Canada requires that they list their totals by category:
salaries, office expenses, fundraising, contributions to candidates, outgoing transfers, advertising,
travel, polling, professional services, bank charges, depreciation, and “other.” Rules for
disclosure are strict, a fact which should mitigate any worries about measurement error. Each of
the 5,387 returns is labeled with the legal name of the party association, from which I extracted
the party and district via a series of string operations. From this dataset, I constructed a variable
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for inter-election spending for each district association. For the interval between the 2004 and
2006 elections, I took the sum of spending in 2004 and 2005; for 2006 and 2008, I used 2006,
2007, and 2008.7 In each case, I omitted bank charges, depreciation, and outgoing transfers and
contributions.8 Elections Canada also maintains electronic records of the spending level of each
candidate during the six-week campaign period (since 19979). I lacked lagged values of
association financing because records are only available from 2004 onward, so I matched a lag of
local campaign spending and contributions with my dataset instead. All dollar amounts from
2005-2008 were adjusted for inflation since 2004 (Bank of Canada 2008).
Since the availability of spending data from the riding associations is limited, estimating
the impact of spending across the entire thirty-year period is impossible.10 The vote shares of
minor party candidates lacking local associations could also not be matched. For these reasons,
1,876 cases remained after merging the collapsed financial records with the voting results. At
this stage, the number of cases where a candidate ran in one election, but not the following
election, dwindled to a handful, because the major parties usually run a candidate in every
district. In these situations, I chose to designate the party’s vote share in the following election as
zero to capture the effect of its failure to field a candidate in a district.11
7 The discrepancy in coding arises from the fact that the 2004 and 2006 elections were held during the first
half of the year, while the 2008 election was held in late October. Unfortunately, local association spending is
only reported for each calendar year.
8 These variables do not plausibly affect vote share within a district, but their removal substantially
reduces my standard errors. In exactly one case, the reported total spending level was less than the sum of
these variables, producing a negative result. Assuming reporting error, I dropped the case from the dataset.
9 Campaign spending data for earlier elections are unavailable electronically, but exist in printed, bound
form at the offices of Elections Canada.
10 One could study the simple impact of reimbursement on vote share in the following election for the
entire sample from 1979 to 2008. When I conducted this analysis (omitted here), my results were consistent
with the findings of this paper: under a range of specifications, I was unable to reject the null hypothesis that
the effect of reimbursement on vote share was zero (p < .10).
11 Analysis under the alternative practice of removing these thirteen cases does not substantively alter the
estimates reported later in this essay.
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V. Identification Strategy
Before introducing the regression discontinuity design, I will first conceive of a relation
between a local party association’s spending and its vote share:
    	
    
Denote t, t + 1, t + 2, … as a time series of elections (Lee 2008). Here, V2 is the party’s
vote share in a given district during election t + 1,  is a constant, and SPEND is the spending
level of the party’s local association between elections t and t + 1.  is the partial effect of
SPEND with respect to V2, or the marginal effect of an additional dollar of spending. C is a
vector of explanatory variables for election outcomes, such as lagged values of the party’s local
spending and vote share.  is a disturbance term.
Our goal is to identify , the marginal effect of spending—the rate at which V2 changes
in response to changes in SPEND, holding other factors fixed. If we assume that the mean of  is
zero conditional on the explanatory variables, we can derive an unbiased estimate of the causal
parameter by regressing sample values of V2 on SPEND—in effect, estimating the relationship
between changes in spending and changes in vote share across our entire sample. SPEND,
however, is likely to be endogenous, so we should not be comfortable with this assumption.
Instead, I use an alternative strategy: I measure how a change in SPEND known to be unrelated
to the explanatory variables leads to a change in V2. These two changes are exactly those that I
hypothesize are caused by the event of reimbursement.
(1) 
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To estimate these changes at the ten percent threshold—where they are exogenous—I
estimate the coefficients of T within the following two regression models:
             

              
         
Here, T is an indicator variable for treatment status determined entirely by the value of V1, whose
score is the sole determinant of T. In this application, V1 is the party’s local vote share in election
t, with ten percentage points subtracted for ease of analysis.     leaves room for
arbitrary transformations of V1, depending upon its underlying functional form, as well as the
possibility of interactions between these transformations and T, where this interaction permits the
parameters of the underlying model to vary across either side the cutoff point. Again, C is a
vector of explanatory variables, and u is a disturbance term.
Lee and Lemieux (2009) specify the assumption necessary to draw an unbiased causal
inference about T from models of this form: the density of units below and above the cut point
must be continuous, conditional on the explanatory variables, C, and the error term, u. Although
I do not claim to break new statistical ground, a reprise of their analysis should illuminate
important features of the identification strategy. Formally, imagine a data-generating process in
which we model V, the forcing variable, as a random variable observable in V 1. For simplicity,
introduce W, one dimension of the unit’s identity, as an unobservable random variable, and G as
the marginal cumulative distribution function of W. Let F(V1 | w) be the cumulative distribution
function of V conditional on W and f the corresponding marginal density function. Also define
(2) 
(3) 
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Y(w, v) as an outcome function, and the functions  	!  "#$%&'( 	!)  and *	! 
	!)  relating the dependent variable to each unit w and the value of the forcing variable V 1.
The key assumption is that F is continuously differentiable in V1 at the point of discontinuity.
Three implications follow:
+,- . !/   01234320354  26577!
8/   9 "#$:&'( 8/  ;
 <*	! 9 	! 	/!	
=
 =
;>	!
+, . 1/   01234320354  265771
We derive (4) and (5) from the application of Bayes’ theorem to the continuity assumption about
F.12 In (4), we have an indication that the identity of units does not systematically differ between
the left and the right sides of the threshold. Statement (5) establishes that estimating the
conditional expectation function at the threshold is equivalent to the average of the impacts of
interest for each unit w, *	! 9  	!, where this average is weighted by a unit’s probability
of appearing close to the cutoff point. The intuition behind this weight is clear: the marginal
density function for V, evaluated at the cutoff point V1 = 0, will be low for individuals far from
the cutoff point. Lastly, (6) is a generalization of (5) to all remaining baseline characteristics C.
These statistical properties imply that a properly executed RD design enjoys two
important features. First, although it is tempting to conceive of an RD estimator as informative
only about a treatment effect only at the point of discontinuity—and, accordingly, as promising
12 Formal proofs of these propositions are available in Lee (2008).
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(6) 
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very limited external validity—it is more accurate to state that the RD design estimates a
weighted average treatment effect, where this weight is a function of a unit’s proximity to the
point of discontinuity. Second, the baseline characteristics of units will not differ, on average,
across either side of the discontinuity. Just like the experimentalist, the RD analyst is free to
include these controls with an eye toward greater statistical efficiency, but choices about the
inclusion or exclusion of covariates will not lead to bias. Moreover, researchers are free to test
this implication—and, by extension, the continuity assumption—by comparing these baseline
variables across the cutoff point. An example is Caughey (2009), who casts doubt on the
identification strategy of Lee’s earlier RD analysis of the incumbency advantage in U.S. House
elections (2008). Caughey discovers that the baseline covariates of the candidates in Lee’s
dataset are not balanced across the threshold of victory, perhaps because incumbents enjoy
disproportionate influence over official recounts.
More generally, we may ask: in what types of situations is this continuity assumption
breached, and can we expect it to hold in the application of the Canadian public financing
system? In nearly every real world setting, individuals possess some control over the forcing
variable; candidates, for instance, could conceivably put forth greater effort as polls show them
nearing a significant cutoff in V1. By itself, this phenomenon does not invalidate the RD design.
Instead, the continuity assumption is violated in any situation where individuals possess precise
control over V1, but holds if individuals possess imprecise control. Lee (2008) formalizes this
notion: if V1 = Z + e, where Z is a systematic component and e is drawn from a continuous
random variable, F remains continuously differentiable at the cutoff point, and RD inferences are
on solid footing. In any particular RD application, then, the analyst is left to establish the
appropriateness of the design by arguing that e is always substantial. In the case of Canadian
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parliamentary vote shares, e is likely to be large. It is particularly implausible that candidates are
able to sort themselves precisely around the ten percent cutoff during election t. Candidates with
vote shares in this neighborhood are overwhelmingly challengers, so there is no room for
political manipulation, as in the United States. Moreover, in the neighborhood of V1 = 0, random
factors such as weather, counting errors, and other election day dynamics are likely to play a
major role in determining final vote share.
Estimating the OLS partial effect of a reimbursement indicator variable, then, also
estimates the causal effect of reimbursement on the dependent variables, just as in a randomized
experiment. What might these variables be? My interviews with practitioners suggested both
several effects. First, the reimbursement could by itself boost political support, regardless of its
size, by instilling supporters with new resolve. Second, reimbursement has a dramatic effect on
an association’s finances in several ways. Not only will reimbursed associations receive larger
surpluses from their local candidates, but according to an anonymous leader of a Conservative
constituency in Newfoundland, the failure to receive a reimbursement may reduce an
association’s ability to receive aid from other associations:
I think it will make it more difficult to get help from other associations and the main
reason for that is that they target districts that have a fairly good chance of winning. If
they write off your district, if they say ‘Why give money to a seat that isn’t going to win
anyway?’ It’s a psychological barrier… Riding associations next time around are going to
be very reluctant to loan money to an association that may not get its ten percent.
Cutting against this phenomenon is the possibility that districts unexpectedly flush with cash
might give those funds to other, weaker associations. Similarly, an unreimbursed association
might solicit additional private contributions to make up the shortfall; at the same time,
individuals might be less likely to contribute to an association they perceive as a failure.
Although the magnitude of the overall effect on spending levels is unclear, it still seems likely
that reimbursement will boost the association’s overall spending level, and perhaps the local
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candidate’s spending level. Changes in spending levels, meanwhile, could affect electoral
outcomes.
It is worth specifying that this paper’s exploitation of reimbursement-induced spending as
a downstream experiment to measure the effect of spending on election outcomes depends on a
further assumption about this causal chain: that none of these intervening variables, besides the
association’s spending level, influence election outcomes. If these variables influence election
outcomes, then the total effect of reimbursement would no longer be identical to the partial effect
of this additional spending. Is it the case that reimbursement has no downstream effect on other
intervening explanatory variables? Although this assumption is probably strictly untrue, the
deviation from it is likely to be small. During my interviews, practitioners dismissed the idea that
the psychological component of reimbursement matters to ordinary voters because few voters are
even familiar with the reimbursement system. In principle, reimbursement could boost the local
candidate’s spending level during the six-week campaign period if associations donate directly to
his account, but this appears not to occur.13
A final issue remains: how should the analyst specify the regression? The researcher must
first decide upon the “bandwidth” of the regression—which data points to include or exclude.
One would be suspicious of findings that depended heavily on information about cases far from
the discontinuity. Yet there is a trade-off: while a tight bandwidth reduces bias, such a window
also increases sampling variability, perhaps to the point where the results are uninformative.
Second, the underlying functional form of the estimated model is unknown. In some
applications, the relationship between the forcing variable and the dependent variable is clearly
13 I have separately produced regression-discontinuity estimates of the impact of reimbursement on
campaign spending in the following election and have found the influence to be both statistically insignificant
and substantively miniscule. In interviews with practitioners, this was expected: there are restrictions on an
association’s contributions to its local candidate, and a large fraction of candidates spend close to their
maximum so as to obtain the largest possible reimbursement.
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linear. In others, it may be curvilinear. In still others, it may be impossible to adequately
reproduce the underlying model that generated the data. Third, one must make a decision about
weights. It seems intuitive that observations close to the cutoff point should bear more on the
final estimates than those farther afield, but there is no obvious basis for this kernel, and many
plausible specifications present themselves. This range of possibilities recommends that the
researcher explore several possible models, so as to instill greater confidence in the recovery of
the true causal effect.
VI. Main Results
To motivate the quasi-experimental analysis, I first estimate the parameter of interest
using traditional methods. Suppose we were to assume, as basic OLS analyses implicitly do, that
the contents of , the disturbance term, are independent of the explanatory variables. We would
conduct a regression of vote share on riding association spending, perhaps with controls for
several observables, such as lagged spending. Table 4 presents the results of this regression.
There is a large, highly significant (p < .01) partial effect for riding association spending—in
levels as well as under a logarithmic transformation. With covariates, we would expect an
additional $10,000 in local association spending to boost vote share by 0.27 percentage points,
for a cost per vote of roughly $70.14 The literature on political finance in Canada supports a
similar prior belief. Carty and Eagles (2004) declare:
It seems evident that the financial health and capacity of local party associations has a
measurable and significant impact on a party’s local electoral fortunes. Even within the
framework of province-wide election campaigns centered on party leaders defending or
14 The average number of votes cast per district is about 50,000. An 0.27 percentage point increase in vote
share, then, is equivalent to about 140 votes, which leads us to an estimate of $71 per vote.
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attacking a government’s record, local parties can win votes by spending more. Money
matters for grassroots political organizations and their electoral success. (p. 572)
But as I have argued, the procedures that have led researchers to this conclusion in the past are
insufficiently rigorous. Since our credence in the OLS results is justified only by unverifiable
assumptions, we must look to an alternative identification strategy.
Tables 5 through 10 report the results of estimation using the regression-discontinuity
model. Three data-analytic choices here deserve attention. First, I limit most of my analyses to
cases where the local candidate spent more than $20,000 in the preceding election,
corresponding to a reimbursement of at least $12,000. This practice eliminates 714 of the 1,836
cases in the dataset. A subset makes sense because small reimbursements do not plausibly affect
spending, but introduce undesirable statistical noise and render the quasi-experimental strategy I
outline in Part V more difficult. Although the $20,000 cutoff is arbitrary, this arbitrariness will
not lead to bias. Because the spending level of the association’s candidate in election t is
determined prior to his vote share, it is not systematically related to reimbursement status for
candidates in the neighborhood of the ten percent threshold. I apply this subset to both the vote
share estimates and the spending estimates. Second, following Green and Krasno (1988), I model
spending as the natural logarithm of total spending plus a constant—here $1,000.15 This
transformation is attractive because it allows the returns of spending to diminish: a $20,000
reimbursement might be just as beneficial to a weak organization as a $40,000 reimbursement to
a stronger one. Third, to increase statistical precision, I include several covariates in the
regression model: lagged levels of campaign spending and contributions, a year dummy, and
dummies for parties, provinces, and party-province interactions. Although I save space in my
15 A constant is typically used here in the spending literature because of the problem of very small values:
one would not expect an increase from, say, $10 to $11 to increase vote share in any meaningful sense.
Experimentation with several other small constants (omitted here) did not substantively affect these results.
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tables by omitting their coefficients, the lagged financial variables enter with the expected sign. I
exclude district population,16 the number of parties fielding a candidate, incumbency status,17
and party-province-year interactions because their inclusion fails to enhance the model’s fit.
Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2010) have devised an RD algorithm that uses local linear
regression and an automated process of bandwidth selection to estimate the parameter on the
treatment dummy. The algorithm uses asymptotic theory to strike a balance between bias and
sampling variability that aims to minimize mean squared error by taking into account the
variability of the dependent variable and the density of the forcing variable. Tables 5 and 8
display the algorithm’s regression output regarding the impact of reimbursement on the party’s
local spending level and vote share in the next election. Each of these tables reports my results in
three panels, corresponding to three possible samples: associations whose candidate spent at least
$20,000, associations whose candidate spent at least $15,000, and the full set of all associations.
The upper panel of Table 5 indicates that reimbursement leads to an increase in spending of
about $19,497 for associations whose candidate spent at least $20,000 in the preceding election.
This finding is statistically significant (p < .05 with covariates, although their omission leaves
the result slightly outside the zone of significance). This conclusion reaches even greater
significance under a logarithmic specification: reimbursement causes spending to rise roughly
threefold (p < .01 with covariates, p < .10 without covariates). These funds, however, are
profoundly ineffective. The coefficient on the treatment dummy estimated with covariates in
Table 9 is negative, rendering the local association’s cost per vote impossible to compute under
my preferred specification. Although this estimate becomes positive under a less-precise
16 Periodic redistricting ensures that population sizes vary only moderately across ridings.
17 Moreover, in many of the specifications, the number of incumbent candidates is zero; parties with a vote
share of about ten percent are overwhelmingly challengers.
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alternative specification without covariates, the coefficient remains insignificant, even at the ten
percent level.
As I anticipate in Part V, however, I will investigate several other potential models.
Indeed, although the appeal of RD depends upon its analogy to a classical experiment, the
affinity between RD designs and experiments belies an essential distinction. Whereas a classical
experiment demands few substantive assumptions of the researcher, the RD analyst can choose
among a multitude of possible econometric specifications. Like any observational study, the true
standard error of his point estimate is the sum of the standard error arising from sampling
uncertainty and that arising from modeling uncertainty (Green et. al. 2009). By itself, a
determination of statistical significance achieves little more than informing the reader that an
author can locate at least one specification that supports his pet conclusion. For this reason, I first
explore the sensitivity of my findings to the chosen subset. The lower two panels of Table 5
reveal my estimates of the impact of reimbursement on spending for the sample of associations
whose candidate spent at least $15,000, as well as the full sample of all associations. Using a
$15,000 cutoff, the results hover at the border of significance (p < .05, two-tailed test), but
remain qualitatively similar. In the estimates produced from the entire sample, the effect
disappears in levels, but remains significant in logarithms. This pattern should not surprise us:
the full sample includes outlying associations whose candidate may have spent very little on his
campaign. For these low-spending organizations, receipt of a reimbursement can lead to a large
proportional increase in spending even if the absolute size of this increase is small.
Second, I explore, in Tables 6, 7, 9 and 10, the sensitivity of the main propositions of this
paper to alternative bandwidths and functional forms, focusing here on the subset of associations
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whose candidate spent at least $20,000 in election t.18 Table 6 estimates the parameter of the
treatment dummy, T, on the natural logarithm of the local association’s spending level during the
interval prior to the next election at the IK optimal bandwidth h, across several possible
polynomials up to the quartic functional form. Table 7 reports the results of this same range of
specifications for a bandwidth of twice this size. The impact on spending is highly significant (p
< .01) across nearly every specification in each table; even the lowest estimate, 0.772, implies
that reimbursement causes spending to nearly double. Tables 9 and 10 reveal the robustness of
the lack of impact on vote share to a similar array of specifications. The coefficients hover
around zero and are frequently negative; under no modeling choice is the impact of
reimbursement on vote share significant, even at the ten percent level.
Two other steps should raise our confidence in these findings. First, although graphs
alone cannot confirm an effect, Imbens and Lee (2009) suggest that a plot of the forcing variable
against the dependent variable is a useful means of examining a putative discontinuity. Figure 2
displays such a plot with the logarithm of spending on the y-axis with a window of ten
percentage points on either side of the threshold, exposing a jump in the overlaid fourth-degree
polynomial at the ten percent threshold. Lest readers think this discontinuity is an artifact of the
chosen subset, Figure 3 reveals the same plot for the entire sample of associations; a similar, if
slightly muted, gap appears here as well. Figure 4 exposes a similar pattern with just those points
within the Imbens-Kalyanaraman optimal bandwidth, each weighted by a triangular kernel.
Figures 5, 6, and 7 plot vote share in election t + 1 on the y-axis against vote share in election t.
Again, first the sample is limited to the subset of cases eligible for a large reimbursement, then
includes across all cases, and then limited to those points used to produce the main results, sized
18 Following Imbens and Kalyanaraman, I employ a triangular kernel throughout. The alternative of a
rectangular kernel (not shown) produced qualitatively similar results.
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by their kernel weights. No appreciable discontinuity appears on any graph. Second, Imbens and
Lee suggest, as a robustness check, that the analyst regress pretreatment variables on the forcing
variable; the RD method should fail to identify a treatment effect. Table 11 reports the results of
this test using lagged values of several financial variables; none of the estimates are significant
(p < .10).
Finally, even though the results discussed so far are modestly robust, readers must still
make sense of the differences among specifications. I offer two suggestions. First, after viewing
the noisy data of Figures 2 through 10, it should not surprise us that the largest differences from
the preferred specification emerge following the omission of covariates. Because lagged
spending levels and province-level political phenomena might reasonably diverge across the
discontinuity in our sample, even if they do not diverge on expectation, relying on a less efficient
estimate that fails to exploit these variables makes little sense. Second, among the remaining
estimates, the output of the IK algorithm merits greater weight than those produced using a wider
bandwidth or polynomial functional form, for two reasons. First, an automated procedure
minimizes the chance that a researcher’s preference for a particular conclusion will distort the
process of model selection—consciously or unconsciously. Second, our willingness to base
conclusions on predictions about data far from the cutoff point should depend on our confidence
regarding the form of the underlying population model. In the extreme case where the researcher
holds full information about the correct specification, for example, any bandwidth less than the
entire dataset would waste statistical efficiency for no gain. That this application offers us little
reason to endorse one specification over another argues in favor of a non-parametric model that
enables us to draw our inferences chiefly from units close to the point of discontinuity, such as
the Imbens-Kalyanaraman algorithm. Taken together, the full array of specifications thus
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confirms the basic finding that reimbursement boosts the spending level of the local party
association—as expected—but has almost no effect on the vote share of the local candidate.
VII. Further Tests
As I have argued, different expenditures may differ in their effectiveness. To explore the
importance of this fact, I produced separate RD estimates for spending, disaggregated by the
categories with which I label specifications (1) through (8) in Table 12. Associations appear to
put most of the additional funds toward administrative costs and little of them toward engaging
with and energizing voters. The point estimates on transportation, salaries, and office expenses
are several thousand dollars each; the coefficients for travel expenses (p < .01) and office
expenses (p < .05) are each statistically significant. In contrast, none of the remaining estimates
are significant, and the point estimate for advertising—the only form of spending whose
effectiveness is supported by field experiments—is negative. I also compute, as a crude measure
of total overhead, the sum of transit, salary, and office expenses, as well as the natural logarithm
of this amount plus $1,000. Specifications (9) through (12) report RD estimates of the impact of
reimbursement on this measure. The effect is highly significant and comprises the bulk of the
additional spending.
The predominance of administrative expenditures is quite robust to modeling decisions.
This finding still holds when covariates are excluded in specifications (10) and (12). Moreover,
Tables 13 and 14 confirm that it persists across an assortment of polynomial forms and data
windows: in logarithms, the increase is at least twofold under even the most conservative
specifications, which produce a coefficient of about 0.7. Graphs support this conclusion as well.
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In Figure 8, I plot the logarithm of overhead spending in the neighborhood of the ten percent
threshold, exposing the expected discontinuity. Figure 9 reveals the same pattern in the full
sample of associations, although the effect is perhaps diluted by the presence of associations
receiving very small reimbursements. Figure 10 displays exclusively the data points within the
Imbens-Kalyanaraman bandwidth, sized by their weights. Overwhelmingly, local party
operatives elect to deploy the additional funds toward infrastructural expenses rather than
engagement with voters.
It is worth pausing for a moment over this discovery. As Ansolabehere and Gerber (1994)
observe, much political spending is administrative, and administrative spending appears to be
markedly less effective than other forms. My results extend this conclusion to Canada and show
its robustness to a new identification strategy. Why might the local leadership of a party decide
to spend a reimbursement so inefficiently? Three possible explanations present themselves. First,
it is conceivable that larger offices and staff rosters might actually be the most efficient means of
translating dollars into votes. Mailings or television spots are likely to be forgotten well in
advance of an election. Meanwhile, greater spending on salaries and transportation costs may
reflect the costs, not just of overhead, but also of a more rigorous procedure for selecting a local
candidate and deploying additional canvassers or volunteer coordinators on his behalf. This
explanation, however, seems unable to account for the magnitude of the findings.
Reimbursement appears not to translate into any increase in advertising or fundraising activity,
even though several field experiments—including at least one in Canada—suggest that voter
contact is an effective means of increasing vote share. Meanwhile, this study’s results suggest
that the marginal decision to spend on infrastructure is spectacularly ineffective. A second
explanation, which likely contributes to my findings, is that local operatives are uninformed
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about the effectiveness of their own spending decisions. (Not one practitioner predicted the null
effect of the additional spending when I asked about the likely impact of reimbursements on
election outcomes, although several said they were unsure.) The third—and most persuasive—
explanation is the emergence of a principal-agent problem between local leaders and the local
candidate in the presence of asymmetric information and diverging objectives. If local leaders
stand to benefit financially from a salary increase, for example, it is unsurprising that they would
allocate a large fraction of the reimbursement grant in this direction.
Finally, I attempted to test one other hypothesis. Might it be that the spending is effective,
but other parties respond to reimbursement via strategic mobilization, blunting this effect? If
other parties divert financial or volunteer resources to districts where opponents were
reimbursed, then the event of reimbursement may increase the party’s local vote total, even if
this event fails to affect its vote share. To explore the potential for this form of strategic
behavior, I asked an anonymous Green Party leader whether this pattern occurs. She said it was
not the policy of the Greens, although she speculated that “other parties may think like that.”
Indeed, this hypothesis appears not to be true. In specifications (3) and (4) of Table 8, I report the
estimates of the RD model with votes cast for an association’s local candidate as the dependent
variable. The coefficient on the treatment dummy is never significant. The event of
reimbursement—and the overhead expenditures it leads to—buys neither votes nor vote share.
VIII. Conclusion
In sum, this essay leads us to two important conclusions. First, I use an RD design to
generate a quasi-experimental estimate of the average impact of campaign reimbursements to
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local party associations in Canada on their spending level in the following election, finding it to
be about $20,000. Remarkably, these grassroots political practitioners elect to spend the bulk of
these additional funds on overhead, such as their own salaries, rather than on voter contact.
Second, the estimated effect of this spending on vote share is not significantly different from
zero, and in fact the coefficient is negative.
These findings are the product of two methodological innovations. First, my usage of RD
to measure the total effect of an increase in campaign spending in a natural setting is, to my
knowledge, novel. The methodology represents a signal advance over alternative identification
strategies, such as OLS or instrumental variables estimation, whose conclusions are subject to
serious methodological criticisms. It is instructive to compare the RD estimate of the ratio I
introduce in Part V to the OLS estimate (with covariates) from Table 4. Under my preferred
specification, the expected impact on vote share of a grant of $20,000 is zero. For simplicity,
compare this prediction to the OLS estimate in levels, where every $1000 in district association
spending leads to an increase of .027 in vote share. A grant of $20,000 would lead to an increase
of 0.54 percentage points in a candidate’s vote share—different, but still well within a 95%
confidence interval. OLS, with suitable controls, performs adequately in this application. As
learners, however, we obtain information about the size of its biases only after comparing OLS
estimates to those produced using quasi-experimental methods. Before acquiring an estimate that
approximates a randomized experiment, our ignorance of the bias would lead us to assign zero
weight to the OLS results (Gerber, Green, and Kaplan 2002). As quasi-experimental estimates
accumulate, rational researchers and policymakers move from a stance of profound uncertainty
to one of bounded uncertainty.
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Second, this paper’s usage of a disaggregated dataset calls attention to the diverse tasks
toward which spending is directed—a phenomenon that often goes unappreciated by authors of
both observational studies and experimental studies. Experimentalists such as Gerber (2004) find
that voter contact is effective, and extrapolate from this discovery the broader claim that
campaign spending is effective. From the finding that the spending of a particular set of
candidates is related to their electoral performance in a particular way, observational researchers
generalize about the effectiveness of other budgets and other candidates. In either case, authors
implicitly assume that practitioners optimize their budgets with an eye toward maximizing the
challenger’s vote share, but this assumption is erroneous. Comparing this paper’s results to a
recent Canadian experiment on Green Party voter contact suggests that the gap between the
marginal effectiveness of money spent on infrastructure and money spent on voter engagement is
enormous (Brown, Perrella, and Kay 2010). Policy decisions that fail to heed this fact may go
quite wrong.
The validity of my findings, of course, is subject to critique. The first threat to validity
concerns the RD design itself. As I acknowledge in Part V, RD estimates are best understood as
a local or weighted average treatment effect: within the chosen bandwidth, observations close to
the threshold contribute more to inference than those farther away, while outside the bandwidth,
observations do not contribute to inference at all. As a result, this paper’s findings are of
diminished validity for candidates more than five or ten percentage points away from the ten
percent cutoff. This problem, though, is less severe than it appears. For several important policy
questions, such as altering Canada’s reimbursement cutoff or evaluating the prospects of public
financing schemes and differing contribution limits for political competition, candidates in the
neighborhood of ten percent are precisely the population of interest.
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A second problem concerns the context of spending. In Canada, spending by a grassroots
party organization necessarily takes place in a different setting than spending by the candidate
himself during the official six-week campaigning period. Although I have suggested that the
activities engaged in by candidates and district associations are quite similar, our willingness to
extrapolate our findings to campaign spending as such depends importantly on assumptions
about the comparability of these alternative settings. Moreover, the estimates may not be easily
generalized to different electoral systems. In particular, they are more readily generalized to
other parliamentary systems than presidential systems, such as the United States, where voters
are thought to be more sensitive to campaign activity. Nonetheless, we should not overstate this
point. If spending is primarily effective through its facilitation of voter contact, and this contact
is of similar effectiveness in Canada and the United States (Brown, Perrella, and Kay 2010), it is
difficult to imagine why the impact of administrative spending would differ drastically between
the two systems.
Lastly, I will trace two implications of my conclusions for public policy. First, my
findings about the behavior of grassroots practitioners are by themselves an intriguing
examination of how local operatives choose to spend an exogenous grant. Further research is
needed on the determinants of the budgets of candidates and party organizations. One possibility
is that these decisions depend heavily on the misalignment of incentives between candidates and
other practitioners. Another is that staffs choose to spend funds received in block grants in
systematically different ways than funds gleaned from individual contributions. In any case, that
they choose to spend federal funds so inefficiently argues that public financing systems should
be carefully structured to prevent practitioners from spending government grants in wasteful
ways.
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Second, my results provide strong evidence that increased administrative spending by
local party associations offers little net benefit to a local candidate. If this overhead is socially
wasteful, this fact supplies an argument for tight limits on spending and contributions, especially
because the most consequential activities are attended to with the first expenditures (Gerber
1998). This evidence also counsels the architects of public financing schemes to look carefully at
how money is spent. The celebrated advantages—and alleged ills—of these systems may be
much smaller than they appear. If funds are primarily deployed to overhead, government grants
will do less to enhance the viability of marginal challengers than we might assume. At the same
time, there is less threat that public financing systems will exclude those ineligible for their
assistance from the political process, such as Canadian party associations whose candidate does
not meet the ten percent cutoff, or that incumbents will manipulate the rules of a public financing
scheme to reduce electoral competition.
This paper uses a unique Canadian policy discontinuity to confirm the importance of the
distinction between spending on voter contact and spending on overhead, a distinction rarely
appreciated in the widely divergent literature on political spending. Canadian party operatives
spend reimbursement grants overwhelmingly on administrative expenditures, but even enormous
increases in these expenditures have small effects on a candidate’s vote share. Previous
observational work has hinted at similar results for campaigns in the United States
(Ansolabehere and Gerber 1994), but this is the first study to estimate the impact of these forms
of spending using a rigorous quasi-experimental design. Future research should both explore the
conditions under which these expenditures are likely to predominate and offer more precise
estimates of their impact on political competition.
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Figure 1: Distribution of Major-Party Reimbursement Sizes, 2004-2006
N = 1394. Bins correspond to ranges of $5000. Because the
sample is limited to combinations of district and party with a
local constituency association, only the Liberal Party,
Conservative Party, New Democratic Party, Green Party, and
Bloc Québécois are represented.
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Figure 2: Polynomial Plot of Log Spending vs. Vote Share, for Associations Whose
Candidate Spent at Least $20,000 in Election t
N = 157. y is the natural logarithm of association spending during the inter-election interval plus 1000, in 2004
Canadian dollars. Each open circle corresponds to a single observation. Solid circles are predictions from a
fourth-order polynomial, estimated separately for each side of the cutoff point.
Figure 3: Polynomial Plot of Log Spending vs. Vote Share, for All Associations
N = 822. y is the natural logarithm of association spending during the inter-election interval plus 1000, in 2004
Canadian dollars. Each open circle corresponds to a single observation. Solid circles are predictions from a
fourth-order polynomial, estimated separately for each side of the cutoff point.
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Figure 4: Weighted Polynomial Plot of Log Spending vs. Vote Share, for Associations
Whose Candidate Spent at Least $20,000 in Election t
N = 64. The size of a circle corresponds to its weight using a triangular kernel and the Imbens-Kalyanaraman
optimal bandwidth of h = 3.95. y is the natural logarithm of association spending during the inter-election
interval plus 1000, in 2004 Canadian dollars. Each open circle corresponds to a single observation. Solid
circles are predictions from a fourth-order polynomial, estimated separately for each side of the cutoff point.
Figure 5: Polynomial Plot of Vote Share in Election t + 1 vs. Vote Share in Election t, for
Local Associations Whose Candidate Spent at Least $20,000 in the Previous Election
N = 157. y is the party’s vote share in a particular district during the following election. Each open circle
corresponds to a single observation. Solid circles are predictions from a fourth-order polynomial, estimated
separately for each side of the cutoff point.
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Figure 6: Polynomial Plot of Vote Share in Election t + 1
vs. Vote Share in Election t, for All Local Associations
N = 822. y is the party’s vote share in a particular district during the following election. Each open circle
corresponds to a single observation. Solid circles are predictions from a fourth-order polynomial, estimated
separately for each side of the cutoff point.
Figure 7: Weighted Polynomial Plot of Vote Share in Election t + 1 vs.
Vote Share in Election t, for Local Associations Whose Candidate
Spent at Least $20,000 in the Previous Election
N = 80. The size of each circle represents its weight in a triangular kernel centered at zero with an Imbens-
Kalyanaraman optimal bandwidth h of 5.28. y is the party’s vote share in a particular district during the
following election. Each open circle corresponds to a single observation. Solid circles are predictions from a
fourth-order polynomial, estimated separately for each side of the cutoff point.
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Figure 8: Polynomial Plot of the Log of Overhead Spending vs. Vote Share, for
Associations Whose Candidate Spent at Least $20,000 in the Election t
N = 157. y is the natural logarithm of 1000 plus the sum of salaries, office expenses, and transit costs in 2004
Canadian dollars. Each open circle corresponds to a single observation. Solid circles are predictions from a
fourth-order polynomial, estimated separately for each side of the cutoff point.
Figure 9: Polynomial Plot of the Log of Overhead
Spending vs. Vote Share, for All Associations
N = 822. y is the natural logarithm of 1000 plus the sum of salaries, office expenses, and transit costs in 2004
Canadian dollars. Each open circle corresponds to a single observation. Solid circles are predictions from a
fourth-order polynomial, estimated separately for each side of the cutoff point.
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Figure 10: Weighted Polynomial Plot of the Log of Overhead Spending vs. Vote Share,
for Associations Whose Candidate Spent at Least $20,000 in the Election t
N = 60. The size of each circle represents its weight in a triangular kernel centered at zero with an Imbens-
Kalyanaraman optimal bandwidth h of 3.56. y is natural logarithm of 1000 plus the sum of salary, office, and
transit expenses, in 2004 Canadian dollars. Each open circle corresponds to a single observation. Solid circles
are predictions from a fourth-order polynomial, estimated separately for each side of the cutoff point.
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XI. Tables
Table 1: Prior Estimates of the Amount of Challenger
Spending Necessary for an Additional Vote
Study Cost Per Vote Office Sought
Jacobson (1985) $12 U.S. House of Representatives
Green and Krasno (1988) $13 U.S. House of Representatives
Levitt (1994) $110 U.S. House of Representatives
Palda (1994) $10 French National Assembly
Pattie, Johnston, and Fieldhouse (1996) $5 U.K. Parliament
Erikson and Palfrey (2000) $24 U.S. House of Representatives
Carty and Eagles (2004) $8 Canadian Parliament
Gerber (2004) $24 U.S. Mayor
For consistency with Gerber (2004), figures are deflated, converted, and rounded to the nearest
1998 U.S. dollar.
Table 2: District Association Finances’ Summary Statistics, 2004-2008
Values deflated and rounded to 2004 Canadian dollars. N =
5387.
Statistic Mean (Std. Dev.)
Outgoing transfers ($) 12,688 (20,582)
Incoming transfers 10,255 (15,746)
Bank charges 156 (285)
Depreciation 43 (241)
Professional Services 722 (2,797)
Outgoing Donations 348 (2,627)
Fundraising Expenses 2287 (5,417)
Office Expenses 2497 (5,172)
Polling 333 (2,319)
Salaries 262 (2,759)
Advertising 1716 (4,597)
Travel 927 (2,908)
Other 793 (3,923)
Total spending ($) 24,754 (33,024)
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Table 3: Canadian House Candidates’ Summary Statistics, 2004-2006
N = 1876. District population is an average of districts, not candidates.
Table 4: Ordinary Least-Squares Estimates of the Effect of Spending by
Challenger District Associations on their Party’s Local Vote Share
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
SPENDING 0.027*** 0.020***
(.007) (.008)
log(SPENDING + 1000) 0.871*** 5.284***
(0.181) (0.165)
v 0.477 0.401
(0.66) (0.068)
v
2
-0.022** -0.198**
(0.009) (0.009)
v
3 0.003*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001)
v
4
-.0001*** -0.001***
(0.00001) (0.00001)
Covariates Yes Yes No No
N 1,364 1,364 1,364 1,364
R-squared 0.783 0.784 0.292 0.429
The first and second rows reveal the estimated impact of spending. Spending figures are in thousands of 2004
Canadian dollars. Sample restricted to elections where t is 2004 or 2006 and associations whose candidate did
not win in election t. The dependent variable is the party’s vote share in a district in election t + 1. Coefficients
on lagged spending, lagged contributions, dummy variables for year, party, province, and party-province
interactions omitted.
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 (two-tailed test).
Statistic Mean (Std. Dev.)
Vote share 26.06 (18.08)
Campaign contributions ($) 18,504 (21,381)
Reimbursement (if reimbursed) 29,244 (14,325)
Campaign spending (all candidates) 24,754 (33,024)
District population 102,639 (21,855)
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Table 5: RD Estimates of the Impact of Reimbursement on Local Party
Association Expenditures, Using the Imbens-Kalyanaraman Algorithm
Linear Spending Log Spending
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Associations Whose Candidate Spent Over $20,000 in Election t
SPENDING GRANT 19,497.65** 9,167.39 1.641*** 0.965*
(9,630.55) (6,634.18) (0.376) (0.516)
Optimal bandwidth h 5.14 5.14 3.95 3.95
N 78 78 64 64
Covariates Yes No Yes No
B. Associations Whose Candidate Spent Over $15,000 in Election t
SPENDING GRANT 20868.23*
(11497.75)
9,400.61
(6,315.80)
0.951*
(0.492)
0.703
(0.485)
Optimal bandwidth h 5.35 5.35 3.95 3.95
N 119 119 92 92
Covariates Yes No Yes No
C. All Associations
SPENDING GRANT 1,159.19
(1,354.03)
789.45
(1,050.95)
0.332*
(0.187)
0.472**
(0.230)
Optimal bandwidth h 7.34 7.34 3.13 3.13
N 697 697 234 234
Covariates Yes No Yes No
Estimates of the treatment effect appear in the first row of each panel. In specifications (3) and (4), the
dependent variable is the natural logarithm of 1000 plus spending, in 2004 Canadian dollars. Coefficients on
lagged spending, lagged contributions, and dummy variables for year, party, province, and party-province
interactions omitted. All values were computed using the Imbens-Kalyanaraman algorithm.
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 (two-tailed test).
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Table 6: RD Estimates of the Impact of Reimbursement on Local Party
Association Expenditures, by Polynomial Specification with Bandwidth h
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
SPENDING GRANT 1.312*** 2.137*** 2.251*** 2.305**
(0.472) (0.604) (0.744) (0.899)
v -0.517* -1.115 -1.057 0.222
(0.295) (0.755) (1.489) (3.308)
v * SPENDING GRANT 0.239 -0.361 -0.922 -3.684
(0.321) (0.902) (1.917) (3.948)
v
2
-0.206 -0.145 1.814
(0.270) (1.141) (4.542)
v
2
* SPENDING GRANT 0.584* 0.934 1.064
(0.318) (1.478) (5.442)
v
3 0.013 0.976
(0.247) (2.156)
v
3
* SPENDING GRANT -0.096 -2.020
(0.312) (2.472)
v
4 0.145
(0.321)
v
4
* SPENDING GRANT -0.006
(0.373)
N 64 64 64 64
R-squared 0.404 0.474 0.477 0.487
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of 1000 plus spending, in 2004 Canadian dollars. Sample
restricted to associations whose local candidate spent at least $20,000 during election t. Tables are least-
squares regression estimates weighted using a triangular kernel. The model is estimated with covariates;
coefficients on lagged spending, lagged contributions, and dummy variables for year, party, province, and
party-province interactions omitted. These four specifications are based on an optimal bandwidth of 3.95
percentage points, as computed by the Imbens-Kalyanaraman algorithm.
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 (two-tailed test).
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Table 7: RD Estimates of the Impact of Reimbursement on Local Party
Association Expenditures, by Polynomial Specification with Bandwidth 2h
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
SPENDING GRANT 0.772** 1.368*** 1.593*** 1.933***
(0.345) (0.487) (0.570) (0.632)
V -0.324** -0.816* -0.262 -0.349
(0.155) (0.438) (0.875) (1.508)
V * SPENDING GRANT 0.355** 0.561 -0.819 -1.878
(0.164) (0.464) (0.963) (1.723)
V2 -0.103 0.242 0.134
(0.089) (0.464) (1.380)
V2 * SPENDING GRANT 0.147 0.128 1.020
(0.096) (0.491) (1.447)
V3 0.050 0.008
(0.0649) (0.443)
V 3 * SPENDING GRANT -0.0825 -0.218
(0.067) (0.459)
V4 -0.005
(0.045)
V4 * SPENDING GRANT 0.018
(0.046)
N 117 117 117 117
R-squared 0.292 0.316 0.353 0.375
Estimates of the treatment effect appear in the first row. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of
1000 plus spending, in 2004 Canadian dollars. Sample restricted to associations whose local candidate spent at
least $20,000 during election t. Tables are least-squares regression estimates weighted using a triangular
kernel. The model is estimated with covariates; coefficients on lagged spending, lagged contributions, and
dummy variables for year, party, province, and party-province interactions omitted. These four specifications
are based on a bandwidth of 7.91 percentage points—two times the Imbens-Kalyanaraman optimal
bandwidth—centered at the point of discontinuity
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 (two-tailed test).
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Table 8: RD Estimates of the Impact of Reimbursement on Election Outcomes,
Using the Imbens-Kalyanaraman Algorithm
Vote Share Absolute Votes Cast
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Associations Whose Candidate Spent Over $20,000 in Election t
SPENDING GRANT -0.32
(2.11)
3.16
(2.36)
-1,385.47
(1,098.24)
1,223.07
(1,350.53)
Optimal bandwidth h 5.28 5.28 5.15 5.15
N 80 80 78 78
Covariates Yes No Yes No
B. Associations Whose Candidate Spent Over $15,000 in Election t
SPENDING GRANT 0.55
(1.89)
2.76
(1.97)
658.51
(987.70)
750.69
(1,103.81)
Optimal bandwidth h 5.48 5.48 5.22 5.22
N 120 120 116 116
Covariates Yes No Yes No
C. All Associations
SPENDING GRANT 0.55
(0.85)
1.47
(1.05)
-124.39
(483.40)
404.67
(584.29)
Optimal bandwidth h 5.24 5.24 5.51 5.51
N 485 485 512 512
Covariates Yes No Yes No
Estimates of the treatment effect appear in the first row of each panel. Coefficients on lagged spending, lagged
contributions, and dummy variables for year, party, province, and party-province interactions omitted. All
output computed using the Imbens-Kalyanaraman algorithm; N reflects the relevant bandwidth.
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 (two-tailed test).
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Table 9: RD Estimates of the Impact of Reimbursement on Vote
Share, by Polynomial Specification with Bandwidth h
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
SPENDING GRANT -0.201 -0.307 -2.089 -5.043
(2.130) (2.929) (3.487) (3.875)
V 1.457 1.246 2.616 0.680
(1.127) (2.875) (5.834) (9.389)
V * SPENDING GRANT -0.695 -0.103 2.840 20.810*
(1.230) (3.318) (7.209) (12.41)
V2 -0.063 0.816 -1.706
(0.723) (3.512) (9.444)
V2 * SPENDING GRANT -0.032 -3.419 -17.79
(0.875) (4.142) (12.13)
V3 0.142 -0.772
(0.560) (3.400)
V3 * SPENDING GRANT 0.230 6.926
(0.662) (4.281)
V4 -0.101
(0.390)
V4 * SPENDING GRANT -0.516
(0.474)
N 80 80 80 80
R-squared 0.523 0.523 0.534 0.576
Estimates of the treatment effect appear in the first row. The dependent variable is the party’s district-level
vote share in the following election. Sample restricted to associations whose local candidate spent at least
$20,000 during election t. Tables are least-squares regression estimates weighted using a triangular kernel. The
model is estimated using covariates; coefficients on lagged spending, lagged contributions, and dummy
variables for year, party, province, and party-province interactions omitted. These four specifications are based
on a bandwidth of 5.28 percentage points, which is the Imbens-Kalyanaraman optimal bandwidth.
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 (two-tailed test).
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Table 10: RD Estimates of the Impact of Reimbursement on Vote
Share, by Polynomial Specification with Bandwidth 2h
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
SPENDING GRANT 0.548 2.179 1.520 2.008
(1.404) (1.963) (2.401) (2.701)
V 1.195* -1.189 0.075 -2.313
(0.613) (1.825) (3.741) (6.563)
V * SPENDING GRANT -0.618 1.743 0.855 3.007
(0.627) (1.876) (3.859) (6.939)
V2 -0.503 0.225 -2.278
(0.363) (1.955) (5.972)
V2 * SPENDING GRANT 0.505 -0.326 2.294
(0.369) (1.998) (6.062)
V3 0.101 -0.732
(0.270) (1.895)
V3 * SPENDING GRANT -0.094 0.720
(0.270) (1.904)
V4 -0.085
(0.191)
V4 * SPENDING GRANT 0.086
(0.191)
N 171 171 171 171
R-squared 0.525 0.532 0.533 0.533
Estimates of the treatment effect appear in the first row. The dependent variable is the party’s district-level
vote share in the following election. Sample restricted to associations whose local candidate spent at least
$20,000 during election t. Tables are least-squares regression estimates weighted using a triangular kernel. The
model is estimated with covariates; coefficients on dummy variables for year, party, province, and party-
province interactions omitted. These four specifications are based on a bandwidth of 10.57 percentage points,
which is twice the Imbens-Kalyanaraman optimal bandwidth.
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 (two-tailed test).
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Table 11: RD Estimates of the “Impact” of Reimbursement on Pretreatment Variables,
Using the Imbens-Kalyanaraman Algorithm
(1)
Lagged
donations
(2)
Lagged
spending
(3)
Lagged
log donations
(4)
Lagged
log spending
SPENDING GRANT 4,578.87
(3,063.68)
-1,577.96
(7,642.00)
0.150
(0.363)
0.081
(0.192)
Optimal bandwidth h 14.83 7.24 5.24 3.82
N 285 107 80 64
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Estimates of the treatment effect appear in the first row. Sample restricted to associations whose candidate
spent at least $20,000 in election t. Coefficients on lagged spending, lagged contributions, and dummy
variables for year, party, province, and party-province interactions omitted. All values were computed using
the Imbens-Kalyanaraman algorithm.
Standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.1 (two-tailed test).
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Table 12: RD Estimates of the Impact of Reimbursement on Specific Categories of
Association Expenditures, Using the Imbens-Kalyanaraman Algorithm
(1)
Fundraising
(2)
Office Expenses
(3)
Salaries
(4)
Travel
SPENDING GRANT -88.627
(1161.52)
4522.765**
(1984.93)
6251.49
(4485.71)
1630.608***
(344.13)
Optimal bandwidth h 11.20 5.28 4.65 8.35
N 182 80 71 125
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Variables (5)
Polls
(6)
Professional
Services
(7)
Advertising
(8)
Other
SPENDING GRANT 108.69
(79.93)
364.86
(347.03)
914.49
(471.88)
-133.21
(1,076.05)
Optimal bandwidth h 8.32 12.23 6.10 6.93
N 124 208 89 101
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Variables
Linear Overhead Spending Log Overhead Spending
(9) (10) (11) (12)
SPENDING GRANT 13,195.19** 6,255.33* 1.433*** 0.784*
(6,299.17) (3,687.82) (0.351) (0.402)
Optimal bandwidth h 4.74 4.74 3.56 3.56
N 71 71 60 60
Covariates Yes No Yes No
Estimates of the treatment effect appear in the first row of each panel. Sample limited to associations whose
candidate spent at least $20,000 in election t. Overhead spending is defined as the sum of transit, salary, and
office expenses. In specifications (11) and (12), the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of 1000 plus
spending, in 2004 Canadian dollars. Coefficients on lagged spending, lagged contributions, and dummy
variables for year, party, province, and party-province interactions omitted. All values were computed using
the Imbens-Kalyanaraman algorithm; N reflects the cases within the relevant bandwidth.
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 (two-tailed test).
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Table 13: RD Estimates of the Impact of Reimbursement on the Sum of Salary, Transit,
and Office Expenditures, by Polynomial Specification with Bandwidth h
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
SPENDING GRANT 1.160*** 2.073*** 2.320*** 2.520***
(0.389) (0.497) (0.658) (0.709)
V -0.384
(0.254)
-1.550**
(0.707)
-1.320
(1.883)
1.451
(3.537)
V * SPENDING GRANT 0.009 0.150 -1.308 -6.567
(0.279) (0.818) (2.101) (3.924)
v
2
-0.470 -0.181 5.738
(0.283) (1.894) (6.474)
v
2
* SPENDING GRANT 0.821** 1.616 -0.522
(0.325) (2.106) (7.266)
v
3 0.081 4.073
(0.520) (4.144)
v
3
* SPENDING GRANT -0.317 -6.229
(0.553) (4.241)
v
4 0.837
(0.854)
v
4
* SPENDING GRANT -0.531
(0.902)
N 60 60 60 60
R-squared 0.495 0.579 0.596 0.630
Estimates of the treatment effect appear in the first row. Sample restricted to associations whose local
candidate spent at least $20,000 during election t. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of 1000 plus
salaries, transit, and office expenditures in 2004 Canadian dollars. Tables are least-squares regression estimates
weighted using a triangular kernel. The model is estimated with covariates; coefficients on lagged spending,
lagged contributions, and dummy variables for year, party, province, and party-province interactions omitted.
These four specifications are based on a bandwidth of 3.57 percentage points, which is the Imbens-
Kalyanaraman optimal bandwidth.
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 (two-tailed test).
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Table 14: RD Estimates of the Impact of Reimbursement on the Sum of Salary, Transit
and Office Expenditures, by Polynomial Specification, with Bandwidth 2h
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
SPENDING GRANT 0.746**
(0.295)
1.322***
(0.408)
1.500***
(0.473)
1.966***
(0.521)
V -0.317** -0.700* -0.129 -2.013 
(0.135) (0.368) (0.727) (1.234)
V * SPENDING GRANT 0.272* 0.276 -1.130 0.204
(0.145) (0.395) (0.826) (1.449)
V2 -0.081 0.276 -1.731
(0.0762) (0.390) (1.135)
V2 * SPENDING GRANT 0.146* 0.154 2.572**
(0.0847) (0.421) (1.224)
V3 0.052 -0.632*
(0.055) (0.367)
V3 * SPENDING GRANT -0.091 0.489
(0.058) (0.390)
V4 -0.071*
(0.038)
V4 * SPENDING GRANT 0.080**
(0.039)
N 105 105 105 105
R-squared 0.331 0.371 0.414 0.446
Estimates of the treatment effect appear in the first row. Sample restricted to associations whose local
candidate spent at least $20,000 during election t. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of 1000 plus
salaries, transit, and office expenditures in 2004 Canadian dollars. Tables are least-squares regression estimates
weighted using a triangular kernel. The model is estimated with covariates; coefficients on lagged spending,
lagged contributions, and dummy variables for year, party, province, and party-province interactions omitted.
These four specifications are based on a bandwidth of 7.14 percentage points on either side of the point of
discontinuity—two times the Imbens-Kalyanaraman optimal bandwidth.
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 (two-tailed test).
